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COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT-THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
ROBERT

B.

KENT*

Involvement of the Supreme Court of the United States with highly
charged public issues understandably occasions fresh debate concerning the proper role of the Court in determining questions of ultimate
governmental power, in short, debate over the doctrine of judicial
review.
As it is sometimes difficult for the judge to distinguish between what
is unconstitutional and what is merely unwise, so it is difficult for the
critic to disassociate his reaction to the results reached in a given case
from his evaluation of the competence of the particular judicial performance. For some the failure to draw such a line robs criticism of
much of its usefulness and reduces it to the level of determining
ownership of the proverbial gored ox.' For others the effort to make
such distinctions is simply unrealistic; nice questions regarding the
nature of the process are of interest only in the context of larger pur2
poses served or thwarted by the particular decision.
This essay is predicated upon the propositions that means are important, that the reasons advanced by courts in support of their judgments
are not simply window dressing, and that questions relating to what
courts ought and ought not to consider are of real and not merely
apparent significance.
INTRODUCTION

If the history of the first amendment in the Supreme Court has been
brief, it has certainly been intense.3 In broad perspective the clash
between expression of unorthodox views and competing societal interests
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 10-20, (1959) ; Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The
Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 125 (1959); Kadish, A Note
on Judicial Activism, 6 Utah L. Rev. 467, 471 (1959); McKay, The Supreme
Court and Its Lawyer Critics, 28 Fordham L. Rev. 615, 626-636 (1960).
2 See Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,
27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 661, 683-695 (1960) ; Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of
Neutral Principles, 7 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 571 (1960).
3 "No important case involving free speech was decided by this Court prior to
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 503 (1951).
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is as old as civilization itself. Important Court decisions, however, date
only from 1919.4 In 1951 Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Dennis v.
United States,5 catalogued the prior adjudications into six types of
cases in which the Court has had occasion to resolve conflicts between
speech and other interests. These involved statutory prohibition of
certain speech because of its tendency to produce crime; regulations
restricting expression in the interest of public peace and the normal
uses of streets and parks; restrictions on picketing; exclusion and
deportation of aliens and denaturalization of citizens because of advocacy
or belief; discriminatory taxes and restraints upon the press. In a
category by itself was placed the case of American Communications
Association v. Douds.8 The Court there "recognized that the exercise
of political rights protected by the First Amendment was necessarily
discouraged by the requirement of the Taft-Hartley Act that officers of
unions employing the services of the National Labor Relations Board
sign affidavits that they are not Communists."' 7 -Despite this discouragement, the statute was held to be valid.
An additional category is needed for a group of cases decided since
Dennis, cases like Douds in that they present no direct regulation of
speech, either as to content or as to mode of expression, but which
involve governmental demands of disclosure of past expression and
affiliation in the realm of political activity, using that term in its broadest
sense. These cases have arisen in several contexts. Foremost are cases
in which legislative interests in investigating with a view toward the
possible enactment of legislation for the protection of nation and state
against the threat of violent overthrow are pitted against the claims of
free expression and those associational relationships which are within
the ambit of the first amendment and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.8 Closely allied are decisions on the validity of
registration statutes under which persons and organizations engaged in
4 Schenck v. United States, 249
5 341 U.S. 494, 529-539 (1951).

U.S. 47 (1919).

339 U.S. 382 (1950).
U.S. 494, 532 (1951).
S No distinction will be drawn in this paper between the scope of the first
amendment and the scope of the fourteenth amendment in relation to freedom of
speech, press, and assembly. It is believed that the proposition that the due process
7 341

clause of the fourteenth amendment makes applicable to the states the specific
prohibitions of the first amendment has validity in this setting. See Gitlow v.

New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ; Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S.
313, 321 (1958); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62
(1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). But cf. Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288-299 (1952) (dissenting opinion) ; Alberts v. California,
354 U.S. 476, 501 (1957) (concurring opinion). Thus the term "first amendment

principles" is used herein in connection with state as well as federal action.
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particular activities are required to disclose their identity and their
membership. Control of corporate activities and the community's stake
in determining the fitness of public employees and persons seeking
admission to regulated professions have also been advanced as societal
interests justifying such deterrence of free expression and association
as may be present in compulsory disclosure of political relationships or
other matters pertaining to one's views, thoughts, and beliefs.
That compulsory testimony is an integral part of our judicial system
is a proposition that need not be labored. 9 It is likewise clear that
legislatures as well as courts may compel the attendance of witnesses
and their testimony on matters of concern to the legislature in the
carrying out of its constitutional functions.' The employment of committees to gather information for legislative purposes is established
as is the practice of conferring upon such committees the power to
subpoena witnesses." The use of contempt process to compel attendance and testimony has been upheld, 12 as has been legislation imposing
criminal sanctions for refusal to respond to interrogation "pertinent
to the question under inquiry."'13
Vigorous use of the legislative inquiry has met the resistance of
witnesses challenging the validity of interrogation. Recognition has
been accorded the proposition that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies to interrogation by an organ of the
legislature.' 4 The assertion was inevitably made that the first amendment, too, limits the power of Congress to compel testimony and that
the fourteenth amendment similarly limits the powers of the states.
The role of the Supreme Court in the determination and application
of these limits is the subject of this paper.
Not until 1959, in the case of Barenblatt v. United States,15 did the
Court squarely face the issue of accommodating the legislative interest
in compulsory disclosure to the competing claims of freedom of expression. However, in a number of prior decisions the Court skirted
the issue; these cases form an important part of the setting in which
the ultimate problem is confronted.
9 See Wigmore, Evidence § 2190 (3d ed. 1940).
10 See McGeary, Congressional Investigations: Historical Development, 18 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 425 (1951).
11 McGrain v.Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).

12 Ibid.
13

11 Stat. 155 (1857) as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958). The constitutionality

of the statute has been upheld. Inre Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
14 Quinn v.United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v.United States,
349 U.S. 190 (1955). See generally Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today
(1955).
15 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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A. The Background to Barenblatt
On several- occasions prior to 1953 witnesses charged with refusing
to answer pertinent questions of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities unsuccessfully sought Supreme Court review of their convictions, basing their petitions on first amendment grounds. 16 In 1953,
in United States v. Rumely"7 the Court reviewed a judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversing the conviction
of Rumely for refusing to produce a list of purchasers of certain books
of a political nature in response to a subpoena duces tecum issued by
the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities. The Court avoided
the necessity of constitutional decision by frankly reaching for a
construction of the authorizing congressional resolution which excluded
from the committee's sphere the subject matter of the subpoena. That
the Court viewed the first amendment problems as substantial is unmistakable. The government had argued that, "At least where disclosure
serves a legitimate purpose, it cannot invade first amendment rights."
For the majority Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Surely it cannot be denied that giving the scope to the resolution for which the Government contends, that is, deriving from
it the power to inquire into all efforts of private individuals to
influence public opinion through books and periodicals, however
remote the radiations of influence which they may exert upon the
ultimate legislative process, raises doubts of constitutionality in
view of the prohibition of the First Amendment. . . . [Ilt would

not be seemly to maintain that those doubts are fanciful or factitious.' 8

Justices Douglas and Black disagreed only as to the scope of the committee's delegated authority; they would have held the interrogation
authorized by the resolution and that the conviction violated the first
amendment. 19
In 1957 Watkins v. United States2" presented the Court with another
opportunity to adjudicate a conflict between first amendment interests
and compulsory disclosure in aid of Congress' power to inquire. Again
the Court declined. Watkins had been convicted for failure to respond
to allegedly pertinent questions asked by a subcommittee of the House
16 Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948) cert. denied, 334 U.S.
843 (1948) ; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947) cert. denied,
333 U.S. 838 (1948) ; Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1949) ; Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C.
Cir. 1949) cert. denied, 339 U.S. 933 (1949). In another instance the petition was
granted, Eisler v. United States, 335 U.S. 857 (1948); the petitioner fled the
country after argument but before decision. The case was removed from the
docket, 338 U.S. 189 (1949) and eventually dismissed. 338 U.S. 883 (1949).

345 U.S. 41 (1953).
Id. at 46.
19 Id. at 48 (concurring opinion).
20 354 US. 178 (1957).
17
'8
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Committee on Un-American Activities. The Supreme Court based
reversal upon due process grounds; the subcommittee had not furnished
the witness sufficient information to afford him a fair opportunity to
judge the pertinency of the questions asked and thus to determine the
legality of his refusal to answer. Although spurning the first amendment as the ground of decision, Mr. Chief Justice Warren flatly asserted
the applicability of the first amendment to legislative investigations:
Clearly, an investigation is subject to the command that the
Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or press
or assembly. . . . The First Amendment may be invoked against
21
infringement of the protected freedoms by law or by law-making.
The Chief Justice wrote for five members of the Court. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concurred in the opinion but emphasized the narrow ground
on which the case was decided. Justices Burton and Whittaker took
no part; only Mr. Justice Clark dissented.
-Two members of the Court reached the first amendment issue22 in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,23 handed down on the day of the Watkins
decision. The New Hampshire legislature had designated the Attorney
General of the state a one man committee 24 to investigate violations of
the Subversive Activities Act of 195125 and to determine the presence
of "subversive persons" within the borders of the state. The Attorney
General interrogated Sweezy, who answered questions concerning many
of his activities. He refused to disclose the contents of a lecture he
delivered at the University of New Hampshire, beyond stating that he
had not there or elsewhere advocated violent overthrow of constitutional
government. He likewise refused to respond to queries regarding his
activities in connection with the Progressive Party. He was ordered
to answer questions concerning both these matters by the Superior
Court of New Hampshire. His refusal occasioned judgment of contempt
of court, and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed. 26 The
Supreme Court reversed, but no ground of decision mustered the
support of a majority. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, for himself and
Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan reached the very threshold of
the first amendment issue. Finding the authorizing resolution unclear
as to the scope of the Attorney General's authority, the Chief Justice
was unable to determine that the legislature wanted the information.
Since only a demonstrated relevance to the legislature's interest could
justify the intrusion upon constitutionally protected interests, imprison21

Id. at 197

22

See note 8, supra.

23
-24

25

354 U.S. 234 (1957).
N.H. Laws 1953, c. 307.

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 588, §§ 1-16 (1955).

26 Wyman v. Sweezy, 100 N.H. 103 (1956).
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ment of the witness for refusing to answer constituted a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. Inasmuch as the New Hampshire
court had held the inquiry to be within the scope of the legislative
mandate, four members of the Supreme Court regarded the Warren
opinion as an unwarranted intrusion into the area of separation of
powers at the state level. Yet of those four, Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan joined in reversal after balancing "the right of a citizen to
political privacy, as protected by the fourteenth amendment, and the
right of the State to self-protection.1 27 It seems clear that the fourteenth amendment interests relied upon by Justice Frankfurter are
closely related to those protected by the first amendment if indeed
28
not identical therewith.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson29 stemmed from a proceeding
brought by the Attorney General of Alabama to oust NAACP from
the state for failure to qualify to do business as a foreign corporation.
The state court ordered the defendant to produce certain records including membership lists. The membership lists were not produced;
NAACP was adjudged in contempt and fined. A unanimous Supreme
Court reversed, sustaining the claim of NAACP that its members'
rights of associational privacy are secured by the fourteenth amendment and were violated in the circumstances of the case. Recognizing
that "it is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty'
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech," 80 Mr. Justice Harlan stated the
issue as follows:
We think that the production order, in the respects here drawn
in question, must be regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner's members of
their right to freedom of association....
We turn to the final question whether Alabama has demonstrated
an interest in obtaining the disclosures it seeks from the petitioner
which is sufficient to justify the deterrent effect which we have
concluded these disclosures may well have on the free exercise by
petitioner's members of their constitutionally protected right of
association.8 '
The sole asserted interest of the state was in aid of determining whether
NAACP was conducting intrastate business in violation of Alabama
law. The Court could not perceive that disclosure of the membership
27 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266-67 (1957)
opinion).
28 See note 8 supra.
29 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
80 Id. at 460.
81 Id. at 462-63.
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lists had a "substantial bearing" upon any issue relevant to that
determination.
In the light of this conclusion, judgment may well rest upon general
considerations of due process rather than upon those aspects related
to the first amendment. Compulsion to appear before an officer of
government and to testify about anything involves coercion of the individual which needs a reasonable basis for its justification. Although
use of the adjective "substantial" to modify the relation required may
indicate a greater degree of scrutiny than that accorded the usual claim
of substantive due process, it will be seen that such limited review
does not account for other factors of great importance. In the absence
of any significant relationship between the names of NAACP's members and the nature of its operations, the decision did not require
analysis of the relative value of the competing interests asserted, and
without such an analysis the interests of freedom of expression are not
truly tested.
B. Barenblatt v. United States
Freedom of expression inevitably encounters its heaviest seas when
pitted against the demands of national security. This is one of the
most difficult of all accommodations required of the institution of
judicial review, that between self preservation, termed by Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson "the ultimate value of any society"' 2 and Mr. Justice
Cardozo's "freedom [of which] one may say that it is matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." 33 This,
in relation to compulsory disclosure, was the issue avoided in Watkins
but faced two years later in Barenblatt v. United States.3 4 Like
Watkins, Barenblatt was subpoenaed by a subcommittee of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. He refused to answer questions
as to his Communist Party membership and on that account was convicted of contempt of Congress. To the Supreme Court he brought
challenges to the subcommittee's authority, to the pertinency of the
questions and his apprisal thereof, and to the validity of the interrogation in the face of the first amendment. The conviction was affirmed by
a vote of five to four. Mr. Justice Harlan, for the Court, described
the judicial function as follows:
Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a
balancing by the courts of the competing private3 5and public interests
at stake in the particular circumstances shown.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
33 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
84 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
32

85 Id.

at 126.
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In this as in prior cases, dissenters vigorously challenged this concept
of judicial review based upon a "balancing of the competing interests."
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas, urged a literal approach to the interpretation of the first
amendment. 36 However, a majority of the Court has never viewed
application of the amendment in terms of an absolute command. The
Court has agreed with what Justice Holmes stated in a different setting:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular
right is founded, and which become8 7strong enough to hold their
own when a certain point is reached.
There exists here a cleavage within the Court in addition to that
just noted. Even accepting, arguendo, Justice Harlan's above quoted
statement of the Court's function, a strong minority of the Court has
challenged sharply the application of that standard in Barenblatt and
in a series of more recent cases. This dispute is not simply over
the striking of the balance resulting from a differing assessment of
commonly agreed upon factors. There is indeed conflict as to the very
ingredients for decision, as to what should be placed in the scales in
the first place.
It is the objective of this paper to examine the implementation of
this judicial concept of "balancing the competing interests" with a
particular view to the relevance of ulterior legislative purposes or
motives.38
After disposing of Barenblatt's challenges to the subcommittee's
authority to compel testimony and to the pertinency of the questions
asked, Mr. Justice Harlan turned to constitutional contentions. After
stating the function of the Court he proceeded:
The first question is whether this investigation was related to a
valid legislative purpose, for Congress may not constitutionally
require an individual to disclose his political relationships or other
private affairs except in relation to such a purpose.8 9
This would certainly appear to be sine qua non to conviction of a wit36
87
38

Id. at 140-144 (dissenting opinion).
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
The terms "ulterior purpose" and "motive" are here used as synonyms to

indicate a desired objective other than that upon the basis of which the governmental action is justified. For example, if Congress passes a statute prohibiting
the shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced by child labor, the purpose
of the statute may be said to be the exclusion of such goods from interstate
shipment. It may be inferable or even demonstrable that beyond that the purpose is
to discourage the use of child labor in manufacturing and beyond that to promote
health in children. The promotion of health may be the ultimate purpose and at the
same time the motive for the exclusion of the goods from interstate commerce.
89 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959).
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ness for defying the subcommittee, but is the source of the limitation
the first amendment? Should not this minimum standard be attributed
rather to the due process clause of the fifth amendment on the ground
that such relevance to a valid legislative purpose is an essential condition of any governmental coercion of the individual, let alone compulsion in those areas of activity encompassed by the first amendment?
The Court found that the inquiry did relate to a valid legislative
purpose, "the power to legislate in the field of Communist activity in
this country ....
In the last analysis this power rests on the right of
' 40
self-preservation, 'the ultimate value of any society'."
A subsidiary question was raised by Barenblatt's claim that the "true
objective" of the committee and of the Congress was the impermissible
one of exposure. This argument was rejected, first as irrelevant because
entailing an examination of "motives," and second because the Court
having scrutinized the record agreed with the court below that "'the
primary purposes of the inquiry were in aid of legislative processes'." 41
Finally, the Court found neither a committee bent on attempting to
pillory witnesses nor a lack of probable cause for belief that Barenblatt
possessed information of interest to the subcommittee. The conclusion
follows "that the balance between the individual and the governmental
interests here at stake must be struck in favor of the latter, and that
therefore the provisions of the First Amendment have not been
offended. "42
The opinion is open to serious criticism on several counts.
First, as already noted, it confounds the question of relevance to a
valid legislative purpose, a matter of basic due process, with the additional claims of the first amendment.
Second, as stated by Mr. Justice Black in dissent:
[I]t completely leaves out the real interest in Barenblatt's silence,
the interest of the people .... It is these interests of society, rather
than Barenblatt's own right to silence, which I think the Court
should put on the balance against the demands
of the Government,
43
if any balancing process is to be tolerated.
Arguably this is a quibble with the Court for failure to utter a truism
to the effect that societal and not simply individual interests are involved in freedom of expression. Yet when the Court is resolving grave
issues on the announced basis of judging the weight to be accorded
competing interests of constitutional dimension, it seems not unreasonable to expect precision in the statement of the interests involved. To
announce the contest as the right to silence on Communist Party memId. at 127-128.
Id. at 133.
42 Id. at 134.
48 360 U.S. 109, 144 (1959)
4

41

(dissenting opinion).
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bership of one Lloyd Barenblatt versus the self-preservation of the
United States of America is to decide the case by stating it.
Third, even as the Court describes the critical element as "the
existence of and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress
in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness," 44 the Court totally
ignores factors previously given controlling significance in both first
amendment and commerce clause cases. The governmental interest in
compulsory disclosure is quickly translated into the safety of the
republic itself on the strength of the slender reed of rational connection
between the two. The extent to which the disclosure serves the national
interest is not considered, nor is the availability of alternatives which
may serve the cause of security at less expense to freedom.
Fourth, attachment of significance to the absence of any indication
"that the Subcommittee was attempting to pillory witnesses ' '45 (emphasis added) is at odds with the declaration of lack of judicial
"authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the
exercise of the power."'46 Assuming that "pillory" is used in its
figurative sense, i.e., any means for exposing to public scorn or ridicule,
it is possible for an inquiry to serve the informational needs of Congress
and eo instante to represent a highly successful attempt to expose individuals to public scorn in a fashion having a substantial effect as a
deterrent to the exercise of freedom of speech. Before such an "attempt"
can be useful as a factor on the side of the first amendment interests,
evidence that the attempt was made must be relevant. Yet the Court
here appears to dismiss such inquiry as beyond the pale, as constituting a matter of motives.
If validity there be in these criticisms their importance should not
47
be underestimated. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's plea in Dennis for
recognition of the true nature of judicial review as inevitably involving
an assessment of competing interests goes unheeded by a majority of
which he is a part if "balancing," too, is reduced to a substitute for
analysis, to a new slogan replacing those so effectively criticized both
on and off the Court.48 Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Dennis is ample
testimony to the proposition that the value of free expression need not
be drained of its public interest content as a prelude to judgment that
Congress reasonably struck the balance in favor of a competing claim.
44 360 U.S. 109, 126-27 (1959).

Id. at 134.
Id. at 132.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (concurring opinion).
(dissenting opinion) ;
48 See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 295-296 (1941)
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 527 (1951) (concurring opinion); see
Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 24-28 (1949) ; Hand, The Bill of
Rights 58-61 (1958); McKay, The Preference For Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1182, 1203-1212 (1959).
45
46
47
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Nor does the process gain respect through inflating the governmental
interest to the status of self-protection, untempered by an evaluation
of the contribution thereto of the compulsory disclosure involved in the
particular case. In the words of Barenblatt itself, the balancing is "of
the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular
49
circumstances shown." (Emphasis added.)
The claim is not made here that a full and painstaking delineation
of the issues involved would have led inevitably to a contrary result.
It is the thesis of this paper that failure so to delineate the issues led
to a highly questionable result in Uphaus v. Wyman, 50 and that express
reliance on Barenblatt in subsequent cases has further reduced the
significance of judicial review without adequate explanation.
II.

COMPULSORY

DISCLOSURE CASES-THE ISSUES FOR DECISION

An application for review of a criminal conviction, judgment of
contempt, or other judicial action consequent to a refusal of governmental demand for disclosure of information will usually include some
if not all of the following contentions:
A. The disclosure demanded is not pertinent to the matter into which
the interrogator is authorized to inquire.
B. The pertinency of the question has not been made sufficiently
clear to the witness to afford him a fair opportunity to determine
his obligation to respond.
C. The particular interrogation is not reasonably related to a valid
legislative purpose which the inquiry is designed to serve.
D. Compulsory disclosure in the particular circumstances violates the
first amendment (or interests of freedom of expression and association protected by the fourteenth amendment against abridgement by state action).
There may well be an overlap of these contentions in specific cases.
Nevertheless, it is believed that separate treatment of the issues posed
is useful to an analysis of the significance of the first amendment and
of the role of the Supreme Court.
A. Pertinency
The issue of -pertinency is basic to judicial review of contempt
adjudications in this area. In the sense the term is used here, however,
is not of constitutional dimension. The matter is one of construction of the authorizing statute or resolution and determination as to
whether a particular question or demand falls within its scope. An
49 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
50 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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essential element of the statutory offense is the defendant's refusal to
answer "any question pertinent to the question under inquiry." 51 Thus
in United States v. RuMely 52 the Court never reached the first amendment. The construction of the authorizing resolution was sufficiently
narrow that the information demanded of Rumely was held to be
beyond its scope. His refusal to respond was thus justified. He had
not rejected a demand pertinent to an authorized inquiry. So in Deutch
v. United States53 the Court found the specific question asked not
pertinent to the scope of the subcommittee hearing. Supreme Court
disposition of cases on this ground is possible when federal authority
to compel disclosure is in issue. It is of course otherwise in regard to
matters originating in state proceedings. The scope of the delegates'
authority is there matter of state law to be finally determined by state
courts. 54 That the determination may involve closely related constitutional issues is the subject of later discussion herein.
B. Pertinency: Notice to the Witness
The claim that the pertinency of the question has not been communicated to the witness with sufficient clarity to enable him to appraise
his obligation to answer is grounded in considerations of due process.
It is based upon the principle that conduct denominated as criminal
must be defined with sufficient particularity to guide the individual in
regulating his activity. 55 This was ultimately the narrow ground of
decision in Watkins v. United States:
It is obvious that a person compelled to make this choice is
entitled to have knowledge of the subject to which the interrogation is deemed pertinent. That knowledge must be available with
the same degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due Process
Clause requires in the expression of any element of a criminal
offense. The 'vice of vagueness' must be avoided here as in all
other crimes.5 6
Such knowledge had not been made available to Watkins. The authoriz2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
345 U.S. 41 (1953).
53 367 U.S. 456 (1961). Justice Stewart wrote for a majority of five. Justices
Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan and Whittaker dissented. The evidence indicated that
the subject under inquiry before a subcommittee of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities was Communist infiltration in the Albany, or "capital," area,
particularly in the field of labor. The questioning of Deutch concerned Communist
activity at Cornell University, one hundred and sixty-five miles from Albany, and
did not relate to labor.
54 But cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 253-54 (1957).
A totally
capricious finding of pertinency may well constitute a denial of due process. Cf.
Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
55 Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959) ; Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959);
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S.
174 (1952) ; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
56 354 U.S. 178, 208-09 (1957).
5'
52
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ing resolution itself possessed "confusing breadth," 57 and neither the
committee resolution authorizing creation of the subcommittee nor the
opening statement of the committee chairman sufficed to define the
question under inquiry. The government contention that the record
amply disclosed the topic of inquiry to be Communist infiltration in
labor was confounded by the fact that several persons about whose
Communist Party connections Watkins was interrogated had no connection with organized labor. And even when Watkins objected to the lack
of pertinency the chairman of the subcommittee failed to clarify the
matter. This same defense was unsuccessfully interposed by Barenblatt,
the Court finding that the matter under inquiry had been clearly indicated by the chairman of the subcommittee.58 There are strong
intimations in Barenblatt, repeated in Deutch, that inadequacy of notice
to the witness is available as a defense only where, as in Watkins, the
witness has raised the issue of pertinency before the interrogating
body. 59 Recent decisions evidence great care on the part of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities to explain fully to witnesses
the nature of the inquiry to which they have been summoned.6 0
C. Relationship to a Valid Governmental Purpose
A claim that a particular demand for disclosure is not related to a
valid governmental purpose involves three considerations: What is
the purpose of the investigation or other inquiry? Is this purpose valid?
Does the particular demand upon the individual reasonably relate to
that purpose?
If no valid legislative purpose can be found the particular interrogation is unconstitutional as a matter of due process of law. 6' In regard
to the problem of relationship, let us assume that an authorizing resolution clearly indicates a valid legislative purpose, but that the particular
demand upon the citizen does not reasonably relate to that purpose.
If the agency involved is federal the matter may be disposed of on
statutory grounds. A question not related to the purpose for which the
inquiry was authorized is not within the scope of that authority. So
far this is basically a restatement of pertinency. However, it is conceivable that interrogation pertinent to an authorizing resolution might
still fall for want of relevance to a legislative purpose; this would occur
only if the resolution announced a legislative purpose and then proceeded to authorize an inquiry into areas unrelated to that purpose.
57 Id. at 209.
58

360 U.S. 109, 124-25 (1959).

59 See also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950).

It should be carefully

noted that reversal in Deutch was based upon lack of pertinency, not upon

inadequacy of notice thereof. That these are separate elements is made clear by
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court. 367 U.S. 456, 467-8 (1961).
1o See Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 404 & n.5 (1961).
61 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
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A state court decision that a particular interrogation falls within the
scope of a state statute or resolution is conclusive in terms of authorization. 62 However, that does not foreclose Supreme Court inquiry into
the reasonableness of the state determination of relevance.6 3 If the
question asked has no rational connection with the avowed purpose of
the inquiry, coercion of the individual to respond must constitute a
denial of due process without regard to first amendment principles. No
balancing is in order at this point. It is only after relevance to a valid
legislative purpose is established that the first amendment inquiry need
begin. That the particular interrogation serves a valid governmental
objective does not foreclose the possibility that it does so with such a
deterrent effect on freedom of expression as to lead to the judicial
64
conclusion that it is barred by the Constitution of the United States.
Such a conclusion, of course, will be reached only after consideration
of many factors which are the subject of discussion below. The point
to be stressed at this time is that the first amendment, if it has any
significance here at all, operates as a limitation upon governmental
action which would be valid were it not for that amendment and the
principles it embodies. If the particular governmental action is not
related to some legitimate purpose, its invalidity need not and should not
be laid at the door of the first amendment.
Several decisions are in point. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,65 the major portion of the opinion deals with first amendment
contentions. Justice Harlan's opinion is significant in this respect, for
as noted above it recognizes that compulsory disclosure can have a
deterrent effect on free speech and association, thus requiring that the
"'subordinating

interest of the state must be compelling' 66

....

Whether there was 'justification' in this instance turns solely on the
substantiality of Alabama's interest in obtaining the membership lists."
(Emphasis added.) 67 Ultimate decision, however, was based on the
Court's inability to find "that the disclosure of petitioner's rank-andfile members has a substantialbearing" (Emphasis added) on the avowed
interests of the state, i.e., ascertaining whether NAACP was carrying
on intrastate business in violation of Alabama law.6 8 It is submitted
that the terms "substantiality" and "substantial" used by the Court are
used in very different contexts with different connotations. Certainly a
But cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 253-54 (1957).
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
64 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
65 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
66 Id. at 463, quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957)
(concurring opinion).
67 Id. at 464.
62
63

68 Ibid.
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substantial connection between the information demanded and the
asserted state interest does not establish the substantiality of the latter.
To require the former is apparently to require a clear demonstration of
the contact essential to due process where intrusion into the lives of the
citizenry is sought to be justified. If such contact is found to exist
only then is it time to inquire whether the state interest served is
sufficiently substantial to justify the effect its promotion in the circumstances of the case will have upon rights protected by the first amendment. To treat substantial relevance to any valid purpose, irrespective
of other factors, as satisfying the demands of free expression and association is to accord the first amendment little more content than the
virtually abandoned concept of substantive due process.6 9
This minimal review sufficed to protect interests of free expression
in NAACP, but the technique casts a cloud on the decision in Barenblatt. In taking up the constitutional issues there the Court stated that
"the first question is whether this investigation was related to a valid
legislative purpose."7' 0 The affirmative answer seems unexceptionable.
But in the face of the first amendment claims the failure of the Court
to look significantly further into the effect on the competing interests
in these particular circumstances is to reduce to the vanishing point
the vigor of the first amendment as a meaningful limitation on congressional action in this area.
Uphaus v. Wyman 71 was decided on the same day. Uphaus had been
subpoenaed by the Attorney General of New Hampshire, acting in the
same capacity as in Sweezy. Uphaus testified fully concerning his own
activities but refused to comply with a subpoena duces tecum which
called for production of a list of guests at a camp operated by World
Fellowship, Inc. of which Uphaus was executive director. When
ordered to produce the list by the Superior Court he refused and was
adjudged in contempt of court. The judgment was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire and by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Mr. Justice Clark, dissenter in Sweezy two years earlier,
wrote for the five member majority. The investigation into the presence
of subversive persons in New Hampshire was undertaken in the interest of self-preservation, as in Barenblatt "the ultimate value of any
society."172 The Court found that the record demonstrated sufficient
relationship between the guest list and the legislative purpose of the
inquiry. Here it must be emphasized that the nexus between the questions asked Sweezy concerning the Progressive Party and the self69 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
70 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959).
71
72

360 U.S. 72 (1959).

Id. at 80, quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
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preservation of New Hampshire was the same as that found sufficient
in Uphaus, for the Attorney General in Sweezy relied upon sworn
testimony he allegedly had received to the effect that "the Progressive
Party of New Hampshire has been heavily infiltrated by members of
the Communist Party and that the policies and purposes of the Progres73
sive Party have been directly influenced by the Communist Party."
In Uphaus it was alleged that the witness had participated in "Communist front activities" and that speakers at World Fellowship ".'had
either been members of the Communist Party or had connections or affiliations with it or with one or more of the organizations cited as subversive or Communist controlled in the United States Attorney General's
list.' -7 Justice Clark distinguished Sweezy on the ground that "the
academic and political freedoms . . . are not present here in the same

degree, since World Fellowship is neither a university nor a political
party. '75 Why these differences in degree are of constitutional dimension
remains unexplained. The interests of the state in the two cases are the
same.7 6 The relationship between the interrogation and the self-preservation of the State found sufficient in Uphaus was likewise present in
Sweezy. The competing demands of free expression explored so thoroughly in the Sweezy opinions of Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter are brushed aside in Uphaus. The determination that valid
legislative purposes are served by the particular interrogation appears
as a practical matter to represent the limit of meaningful judicial review,
rather than simply a prelude to full elaboration of first amendment
issues.
Nothing in the later case of Bates v. Little Rock 77 dispels this impression. A municipal taxing ordinance required organizations operating within the municipality to furnish the City Clerk upon request
various items of information including lists of dues-paying members
and contributors. The information furnished became a matter of public
record. The custodian of the records of the local branch of NAACP
was convicted for refusal to furnish the lists. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion contains extended
discussion concerning compulsory disclosure as a deterrent to freedom
7s Wyman v. Sweezy, 100 N.H. 103, 111 (1956), quoted in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 252, n.13 and at 265 (concurring opinion) (1957).
74 360 U.S. 72, 79 (1959), quoting Wyman v. Uphaus, 100 N.H. 436, 442 (1957).
75 360 U.S. 72, 77 (1959).
76 In neither case was the fact that the Attorney General had received such
testimony introduced in evidence before the Superior Court which ordered the
witnesses to respond and adjudged them in contempt for refusal to do so. This
omission in the record was noted in Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234, 252 n.13. In Uphaus it
was ignored. See Petition for Rehearing, pp. 2-4. Rehearing was denied, 361 U.S.
856 (1959).
77

361 U.S. 516 (1960).
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of expression and association, and yet the crux of the decision is found
in the following:
In this record we can find no relevant correlation between the
power of the municipalities to impose occupational license taxes
and the compulsory disclosure and publication of the membership
lists of the local branches of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.78
This alone is enough to invalidate the conviction without regard to the
deterrent effect on expression. 9 That this ground of decision might
be emphasized subsequently to narrow the precedent value of the case
appears to be the provocation for Mr. Justice Black's concurrence, in
which Mr. Justice Douglas joined. For them judgment rested squarely
upon the principles of the first amendment.
In two recent decisions freedom of expression and the associational
rights appurtenant to it prevailed against competing state interests,
even though in both instances the disclosure sought to be compelled
related to a valid governmental purpose. The rights of expression
were held paramount to the state interest as served in the particular
circumstances. Shelton v. Tucker 0 is particularly significant. By a
vote of five to four the Court struck down an Arkansas statute requiring all teachers and prospective teachers in public institutions to submit
to the hiring authority an affidavit disclosing all organizations to which
the applicant belongs or has belonged during the previous five years
and all organizations to which he has made regular payments in the
form of dues or contributions during the same period. The requirement in practical operation was an annual one. For the majority Mr.
Justice Stewart did not find the statute unrelated to the state's interest
in the competency and fitness of its teachers. He did find that "the
statute's comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes
far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legiti... 81 Justice Stewart alone of the Barenblatt and
mate inquiry.
Uphaus majorities voted to invalidate the act. Justice Harlan's dissent,
joined by Justices Frankfurter, Clark, and Whittaker is particularly
noteworthy. He would have upheld the Arkansas law on the authority
of Bhrenblatt and Uphaus, distinguishing NAACP v. Alabama and
Bates v. Little Rock. He-stated:
The rights of free speech and association embodied iu the
Id. at 525.
The Court does add, "We conclude that the municipalities have failed to
demonstrate a controlling justification for the deterrence of free association which
the compulsory disclosure of membership lists would cause." Supra, n.77 at 527.
However, this seems to follow as a matter of course from the statement quoted in
the text. Supra, n.78.
80 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
78
79

81 Id. at 490.
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'liberty' assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment (citations omitted) are not absolute. Where official action is
claimed to invade these rights, the controlling inquiry is whether
such action is justifiable on the basis of a superior governmental
interest to which such individual rights must yield. When the
action complained of pertains to the realm of investigation, our
inquiry has a double aspect: first, whether the investigation relates
to a legitimate governmental purpose; second, whether judged in
the light of that purpose, the questioned action has substantial
relevance thereto. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109;
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72.82
To assume the superiority of the governmental interest from its
legitimacy alone is hardly to balance the competing interests. If the
inquiry has only the "double aspect" indicated then of course the
dissenters are right. The affidavits required do have relevance to teaching fitness in that they are part of the total background of the individual. Certainly the employment of able teachers is a legitimate
governmental purpose. But to limit the scope of review to legitimacy
of purpose and relevance of the disclosure compelled is, again, to
narrow review toward the minimal standard employed in the realm of
substantive due process. Justice Harlan's dissent tends to confirm the
belief that this was the limited scope of review accorded Barenblatt
and Uphaus. That this review can be meaningful is demonstrated by
NAACP v. Alabama and Bates v. Little Rock. It is regarded as inadequate by several members of the Court. It was inadequate for
Justice Stewart in Shelton v. Tucker and even for Justice Harlan in
8 3 There a Los Angeles ordinance forTalley v. State of California.
bidding the distribution of any handbills not containing the name and
address of the author and distributor was held "void on its face" in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Black for five members of the Court. Justice
Harlan concurred on the ground that the ordinance allegedly aimed at
fraud, deceit, obscenity, and libel was "not so limited, and I think it
will not do for the State simply to say that the handbills must be
suppressed in order to identify the distributors of those that may be of
an obnoxious character." '
Los Angeles' showing fell short of an
"acceptable justification for the deterrent effect on freedom of expression which this all-embracing ordinance is likely to have." 8 5 The
enunciated purpose was the legitimate one of preventing the use of
handbills for fraud, deceit, obscenity, etc., and the dissenters, Justices
Clark, Frankfurter, and Whittaker not only found compulsory disclosure of authorship reasonably related to that purpose, but they also
82

Id. at 497-98 (dissenting opinion).

83 362 U.S. 60 (1960).

Id. at 66 (concurring opinion).
85 Id. at 67 (concurring opinion).
84
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found the deterrent to free expression negligible in comparison to the
substantiality of the city's interest.
.There is then a serious question how far judicial review will go
beyond the relationship between the disclosure compelled and a legitimate governmental purpose.8 6 It seems clear that it goes at least that
far. Therefore the remaining two questions posed at the outset of this
section are of consequence. What is the purpose of the investigation or
other inquiry? Is that purpose valid ?87 A full discussion of what constitute the valid purposes of legislative inquiries is beyond the scope of
this paper. That the power to inquire is as broad as the power to
legislate is a proposition which has been advanced."" It has likewise
been asserted that legislative inquiries may not roam into spheres in
which legislation itself cannot be enacted constitutionally. 9 The Supreme Court in Watkins uttered the oft quoted dictum, "We have no
doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of
exposure."' 9 Assuming that this be so, or that other limitations do
exist, the review of compulsory disclosure cases involves an identification of the governmental purpose of the inquiry.9 1
It is in regard to this determination that a serious difference has
developed within the Court concerning its function. If the information
demanded of the individual substantially relates to an avowed governmental purpose which is valid, should the Court be receptive to the
contention that such avowed purpose was not the true purpose and
that the latter is beyond the ambit of legitimate governmental inquiry?
This question involves consideration of the relevance of ulterior purposes or motives 92 of two separate bodies, the parent legislature or
branch thereof authorizing the inquiry and the committee or other
delegate upon which the power to compel disclosure is bestowed. As a
general proposition the Court will not inquire into the motives which
impelled legislators to vote for particular measures.9 3 Justice Brandeis
wrote for the Court when he said, "Into the motives which induced
members of Congress to enact the Boulder Canyon Project Act, this
86 Justice Harlan's willingness to accord broader review in Talley v. California
is probably attributable to the fact the case does not involve "the realm of
investigation." See note 78 supra, and accompanying text.
87 These questions *were treated as germane in Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959).
88 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174-75 (1927); see Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev.
153 (1926); Morgan, Congressional Investigations and Judicial Review: Kilbourn
v. Thompson Revisited, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 556 (1949).
89 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 58 (1953) (concurring opinion);
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 198 (1957).
90 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
91 Such purpose has been said to be presumed; Townsend v. United States,
95 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See Jaffe & Nathanson, Administrative Law
491 (2d ed. 1961).
92 See note 38, supra.
93 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130 (1810).
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Court may not enquire."" In sustaining a South Carolina statute
prohibiting the mixing of funeral directing and insurance, a unanimous
Court spoke through Mr. Justice Murphy, "A judiciary must judge by
results, not by the varied factors which may have determined legislators'
votes. We cannot undertake a search for motive in testing constitu9
tionality."96 To the extent that Hammer v. Dagenhart
" represents a
departure from that principle, it has of course been overruled.9 7 It is
sometimes asserted that in the area of federal taxation motive, or
ulterior purpose, has a unique role in judicial review. In the main, the
cases do not bear this out. While the Court has had occasion to conclude that a measure labeled "tax" was in reality something else, that
which it has determined to be a tax it has not invalidated because of
9
the ulterior purposes of the legislature in enacting it.
8 An exaction
conditioned upon the illegality of an act has been denied the constitutional status of a tax despite legislative affixation of that label," but
the Court has consistently rejected the contention that a revenue measure
is unconstitutional because of its oppressive rate or its reporting requirements, or because it was designed for the purpose of discouraging or
even destroying the activity taxed. 100
In the Child Labor Tax Case'0 1 the Court refused to classify the
challenged measure as a tax. It is significant that the Court declared
that "We must construe the law and interpret the intent and meaning
of Congress from the language of the act.' 10 2 Decision that the measure
exacted a penalty was based upon a number of factors: The exaction
was triggered by a departure from a prescribed course of conduct set
forth in detail; the heavy assessment depended only on a single act
of employment of a person below the prescribed ages; scienter was a
condition of liability; inspections were directed not only by the Treasury
Department but also by the Department of Labor; the Court could find
no revenue raising purpose at all. l 03
United States v. Kahriger04 represents a recent approach to this
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931). And see cases there cited.
Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Company, 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1948).
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
98 McCray .v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
99 United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
100 United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
94
95
96
97

101 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
102 Id. at 36.

103 See also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936), does depart from this pattern. The processing tax there held
invalid was clearly productive of revenue. Its unconstitutionality stemmed from
its use as part of a scheme to regulate agricultural production. Motive was here
decisive. However, this case though never overruled has been stripped of vitality
by subsequent decisions. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
104 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
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problem. A tax upon persons engaged in the business of receiving
wagers and the related requirement that such persons register with the
Collector of Internal Revenue were upheld as productive of revenue,
regardless of regulatory effect. The Court, over Justice Frankfurter's
dissent, declined an invitation to invalidate the measure by virtue of
legislative history indicating a congressional motive to suppress wagering.
Grosiean v. American Press Company, Inc., 05 treated more extensively below, should be noted here for what it did not decide, that
the measure in question was not a tax. To relate this to the thesis of
this paper we must recall that the question now under consideration
is the relationship of the governmental action to a valid legislative
purpose. That such a relationship must exist is essential to constitutionality but is not conclusive of it. An exaction, be it of money or of
information, may be reasonably related to a valid legislative purpose
and still run afoul of some specific constitutional prohibition. But the
specific prohibition is not relevant until the basic question of power
has been decided.
To judicial consideration of the reasons the members of the legislature chose to exercise power, the underlying objectives are both
practical and philosophical. To contemplate importation into constitutional adjudication of a factual inquiry into the subjective intent of every
Senator and Representative, to say nothing of the executive who signs
the measure in question, is to contemplate utter chaos and is at the same
time to inject the Court into the legislative domain. Even in that rare
case in which the internal legislative history alone is enough to "give
one the libretto to the song,"' 0 6 the Court since Marshall has abjured
deciding questions of power on the basis of motive. 10 7 Nowhere is
the Court's attitude stated more succinctly than by Mr. Justice Stone
in United States v. Darby: "Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause." (Emphasis added.)' 0 8
So it may be said that if a House of Congress or the legislature of a
state authorizes an investigation for the expressed purpose of informing itself regarding any of that vast number of matters concerning
which that body may constitutionally legislate, then the investigation
relates to a valid legislative purpose irrespective of why any or all
individual members voted for it. One may go a step further. If the
105 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
106

Frankfurter, J. dissenting in. United States v. Kahriger,. 345 U.S. 22, 39

(1953).
107

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130 (1810).

108 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
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committee directed to conduct the investigation propounds to a witness
a question related to the purpose of the investigation, the question does
not lose its validity through the underlying motives of the committee
members, however clearly these may appear. For the judicial determination of whether the particular interrogation is related to a valid
legislative purpose, those motives simply have no relevance. The dictum
in Watkins relied upon in Barenblatt states that committee members'
"motives alone would not vitiate an investigation which had been
instituted by a House of Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose
is being served."' 1 9
The issue is clearly posed in the recent case of Wilkinson v. United
States.110 Wilkinson was convicted of contempt of Congress for refusal
to answer a question as to Communist Party membership propounded
by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, Mr. Justice Stewart speaking for a majority of five. His opinion separated the argument that
the committee was not pursuing a valid legislative purpose from the
contention that the interrogation violated first amendment rights. Although the latter is given rather short shrift, the fact of separation is a
genuine aid to understanding the Court's attitude toward motive in
relation to the issue of relevance to a valid legislative purpose. Wilkinson sought to justify his refusal on the ground, inter alia, that although
the hearings may have been pursuant to a valid legislative purpose, the
committee interrogated him for the purpose of exposing him to public
censure for his activities in opposition to the committee generally and
to the instant hearings in particular. After rejecting the substance
of this contention, Mr. Justice Stewart added:
Moreover it is not for us to speculate as to the motivations that
may have prompted the decision of individual members of the subcommittee to summon the petitioner."'
Mr. Justice Black characterizes this as a "sweeping abdication of
judicial power" which permits the committee to "continue to harass its
opponents with absolute impunity so long as the 'protections' of Barenblatt are observed." 1 2 With Justice Black's view that the first amendment claims are inadequately treated both here and in Barenblatt the
present writer agrees, but Justice Stewart's position regarding motive,
taken in its context, is hardly judicial abdication. It is stated not in
connection with first amendment issues, but on the previous question
as to whether the interrogation substantially relates to a valid legisla109 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).

110 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
111 Id.at 412.
112 Id. at 417 (dissenting opinion).
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tive purpose which the committee was directed to serve. The inquiry of
Wilkinson as to membership in the Communist Party either does or
does not relate to the legislative purpose which the Court has found
contained in the House Resolution establishing the Committee on UnAmerican Activities. That relationship is neither added to nor subtracted from by the motives which may have spurred the interrogation.
The dissenting justices are not alone in fearing that refusal to examine the motives of the committee members means virtually a free
hand for the committee in using the subpoena power to harass its
critics. 113 However, meaningful judicial review need not come in the
form of an unprecedented practice of going behind the articulated legislative purposes to determine why the investigation was authorized.
Nor need the Court try the motives of the committee members in the
course of deciding whether the questions asked relate to the purposes
disclosed in the authorizing resolution, for no matter how valid the
purpose, no matter how substantial the relationship between that purpose and disclosure demanded of the individual, the governmental action
is subject to the specific limitations imposed by the Constitution. "The
First Amendment may be invoked against infringement of the protected
freedoms by law or by law-making. '114
If the above analysis is correct not only is Justice Black's Wilkinson
claim of "judicial abdication" misplaced, but also misdirected at least in
part is the penetrating and pursuasive dissent of Mr. Justice Brennan
in Uphaus v. Wyman. 1 5 At the outset is the following:
This record, I think, not only fails to reveal any interest of the
State sufficient to subordinate appellant's constitutionally protected
rights, but affirmatively shows that the investigatory objective
was the impermissible one of exposure for exposure's sake." 116
The first of these conclusions of course relates to the constitutional
issue of freedom of expression, but the second involves an inquiry
behind the enunciated legislative purpose into the motives of the legislature and its one man investigating committee, the Attorney General.
It is hard to quarrel with this approach because Justice Brennan so
fully and effectively documents his proposition. As will appear below
much of what he says in relation to purpose is relevant to the issue of
free expression. It is here urged, however, that on the issue of relation
to a valid legislative purpose, the purpose must be accepted as declared
by the legislature, its validity determined, and the information demanded from the witness analyzed for relationship to thac purpose.
118 See editorial, The Court and Congress, N.Y. Times, March 1, 1961, p. 32,
cols. 3-4 (city ed.).
114 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957).
115 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959).
118 Ibid.
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If the demand for disclosure passes muster on these counts, then only
those first amendment principles made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment stand in the way of affirmance of the judgment
below.
The Uphaus majority's handling of the problem of legislative purpose reduced it to utter simplicity. The resolution authorized and directed the Attorney General to investigate with respect to violation of
the state's Subversive Activities Act and to determine the presence
within the State of subversive persons as defined in the act. He was
directed to report to the legislature. Inasmuch as subversive persons
were defined with a view towards violent overthrow of the government
of the state, the legislative purpose served was determined to be selfpreservation. The Attorney General was directed to ascertain whether
there were subversive persons within the state. "The obvious starting
point of such an inquiry was to learn what persons were within the
State. '117 Guests being persons, the relevance of World Fellowship's
guest list was thus established. One may question the substantiality of
the relationship between persons and subversive persons. The relationship is buttressed, however, by the assertion that the "record reveals
that appellant had participated in 'Communist front' activities and that
'not less than nineteen speakers invited by Uphaus to talk at World
Fellowship had either been members of the Communist Party or had
connections or affiliations with one or more of the organizations cited
as subversive or Communist controlled in the United States Attorney
General's list.' "118 To be sure a close scrutiny of this record may
confirm rather than allay doubts about this,11 9 but a Supreme Court
finding of such relationship should end judicial inquiry as to the legislative purpose as a factor of independent significance.
D. The First Amendment
Decision in favor of the recalcitrant witness on any of the grounds
heretofore discussed does not reach the hypersensitive area of ultimate
governmental power. Decision that a congressional committee has overstepped its authority can be followed by legislative expansion of that
authority. Reversals for failure to make clear to witnesses the pertinency of questions can be limited in their effect through easy alterations in committee practices. Even in those instances in which state
court judgments are reversed for lack of sufficient nexus between the
demand upon the individual and the asserted purpose of the inquiry,
the state is not foreclosed from demanding disclosure of relevant in117 Id. at 78.
118 Id. at 79.
119 See note 76 supra.
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formation nor from articulating the purpose of the inquiry in such a
way as to demonstrate the relevance of the information previously refused. But when judicial decision sustains first amendment objections,
the implications may be more grave. No matter how clearly the request for information is within the scope of the interrogator's authority, no matter how explicitly pertinency is made known, no matter how
directly related is the question to a valid legislative function, the government cannot compel disclosure if the Court concludes that to do so
would violate the first amendment or its principles contained in the
fourteenth. This then is judicial review in its starkest form, for the
Court to deny validity to what Congress or the state legislature has
found not only constitutional but in the interest of the people it represents. The role of the Court in enforcing constitutional prohibitions
has hardly been neglected of late.' 20 To catalogue like all Gaul attitudes toward that role is oversimplification, but it is believed not inaccurate. The commandments of the first amendment (and the rest
of the Bill of Rights) can be left largely to the legislature, to serve as
"counsels of moderation"'121 on the theory that by its very nature the
judiciary is incapable of their nurture. 122 Conversely the Court has
been urged to enforce these particular provisions in accordance with
their literal phraseology; no law means no law.2'a It is not surprising
that the Court has followed the road between. After years of attempting to articulate a formula for decision in cases involving freedom of
expression, the Court majority has stated forthrightly what has probably always been so, that resolution of the issues involves a "balancing
of the competing interests in the particular circumstances shown."'1 24
Mr.- Justice Frankfurter has variously termed the process "careful
weighing of conflicting interests' 12 5 and "[a] ccommodation of these contending principles-the one underlying the power of Congress to investigate, the other at the basis of the limitation imposed by the First
Amendment."' 126 If there is danger in formulae which "tend to convey
a delusion of certitude when what is most certain is the complexity of
the strands in the web of freedoms which the judge must disentan120 See notes 1 and 2 supra; see also Jackson, The Supreme Court in the
American System of Government (1955); Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958).
121 Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization (1944),
reprinted in Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 172, 181 (1952). See also Richardson,
Freedom of Expression and The Function of Courts, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 44-54
(1951).
122 See generally Curtis, Law as Large as Life (1959).
12 See Mr. Justice Black concurring in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157
(1959). See also Douglas, The Right of the People (1958) ; Black, The Bill of
Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865 (1960).
124 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1960).
125 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 542 (1951) (concurring opinion).
120 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953).
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gle, ' 127 so there is difficulty in the use of metaphorical scales. A tendency to strive for measurable preponderance can becloud the ultimate
judicial act, the exercise of judgment. The need is for identification and
elaboration of those elements upon which judgment is finally based.
Wilkinson v. United States,128 discussed above in connection with
29
legislative purpose, and a companion case, Braden v. United States,"
involved challenges to the validity of compulsory disclosure, challenges
based upon the first amendment. Justice Stewart's salutary separation of the issue of relationship to a valid legislative purpose from that
of freedom of expression and association has already been discussed. 180
Having treated the former in painstaking fashion the Wilkinson opinion disposed of the first amendment problem:
We come finally to the claim that the subcommittee's interrogation of the petitioner violated his rights under the First Amendment. The basic issues which this contention raised were thoroughly canvassed by us in Barenblatt. Substantially all that was
said there is equally applicable here, and it would serve no purpose to enlarge this opinion with a paraphrased repetition of what
was in that
opinion thoughtfully considered and carefully ex31
pressed.
Braden's assertions too are disposed of "upon the reasoning and
1
authority of Barenblatt. ''
These cases are disturbing for three reasons. In the first place this
observer cannot share Justice Stewart's enthusiasm for the thoroughness of Baren'blatt.13P Second, if the criticism of that decision is warranted, its inadequacies are compounded by the sweeping effect given
it here. Third, the Court fails to deal with asserted differences between these cases and Barenblatt in the context of the first amendment claims.
The starting point of inquiries of this sort must be the effect of the
challenged governmental action upon interests protected by the first
amendment. Without a showing of harm to those interests there is
no accommodation required. In Schneider v. State,134 the Court held
unconstitutional four ordinances restricting the distribution of handbills. Justice Roberts wrote:
In every case, therefore, in which legislative abridgement of
the rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the
127

Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 27-28 (1949).

128
129

365 U.S. 399 (1961).
365 U.S. 431 (1961).

130
181
132

See p. 464, supra.
365 U.S. 399, 413-14 (1961).
365 U.S. 431, 435 (1961).

133 See pp. 451-52, supra.
134

308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preference
or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so
vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as
cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts
to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of
the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. 135 (Emphasis added.)
This element is most significant, for views have been expressed by
individual members of the Court which, if accepted, would have ended
at the threshold the application of the first amendment to some disclosure cases. Mr. Justice Clark's dissents in Watkins, Sweezy, and
0
Talley v. California'"
are of this character. In each instance Justice
Clark finds no significant adverse effect upon freedom of expression.
The most vulnerable aspect of the Court's Barenblatt opinion lies in
its failure to articulate the effect upon freedom of expression of enforced disclosure of political beliefs and associations. The first amendment rights asserted are indeed public rights, public in two respects;
first, the public interest in the freedom of the individual in terms of
his own dignity, and second, in terms of the need of the public for
the full and free discussion so eloquently described as "the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."' 13 7
To recognize frankly this broad character of the first amendment is
not a prelude to deciding all cases in favor of the individual involved.
Of course the critical element to the contrary is the weight to be
ascribed to the governmental interest in demanding disclosure from the
unwilling witness.
This is to state the competing claims in broadest perspective. The
difficulty with the opinions, majority and dissenting, in Barenblatt
can be traced to their failure to narrow the focus to the particulars of
the circumstances involved a8 and their silence concerning factors militating against the result reached.
The ingredients for decision would appear to include the following,
although no such list can claim completeness in view of the possible
variations in circumstances.
1. Identification of the Competing Interests
There is great need for precise identification of the competing interests involved. It would seem clear that exposure of an association,
135
136
'87
138

Id. at 161.

362 U.S. 60, 67 (1960).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).

See Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 533,

553-54 (1951).
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however hurtful, is not the equivalent of prohibiting it. So also information which clearly would not justify prosecution for violation of
the Smith Act might well suffice to warrant interrogation into the
need for further legislation in aid of national security.'5 9
Underlying the Court's opinions in Barenblatt and Uphaus is the
assumption that the power to compel testimony is co-extensive with
the power to investigate. It has been suggested that this assumption
is not warranted.1 40 To refuse to imprison the recalcitrant witness because his interrogation in the circumstances grievously invades constitutionally protected rights is not to enjoin a committee hearing nor
otherwise to narrow the doctrine of legislative immunity.14' With this
may be coupled the added deterrent effect on expression of unpopular
views attendant upon the forced public disclosure of one's associations,
142
including the names of other people.
A distinction may be drawn between the greater governmental interest in compulsory disclosure in the realm of governmental operation
and the corresponding interest in examining into private affairs, 143 a
distinction that has been accorded judicial recognition but significantly
not in the recent cases upholding compulsory disclosure against first
amendment claims where government operations were not involved.
In a somewhat separate class are cases involving statutes requiring
44
registration of organizations and disclosure of their memberships .
Laws requiring such disclosure may be distinguished from the disclosures demanded of witnesses under authority conferred in general
terms upon court or legislative committee. First, such laws are aimed
at organizations engaged in particularly described activities. 145 Second, they are the product of the entire legislative process including
the possibility of executive veto. That such statutes may themselves
139 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 130 (1959).
See Kalven, Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27
U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 327-28 (1960).
141 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
142 That the witness has standing to assert the first amendment interests in
associational privacy of those whom his testimony would expose appears settled by
NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958) ; cf. Uphaus
v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1959); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524,
n.9 (1960).
143 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200, n.33 (1957); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490-91 (1960) (dissenting opinion) ; Newman, The Supreme
Court, Congressional Investigations, and Influence Peddling, 33 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
796, 798-802 (1958).
144 Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961) ; New York ex rel., Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63
(1928).
145 That such activities may involve advocacy does not prohibit registration
requirements if a valid public interest in the identity of the registrants and their
members can be demonstrated. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ;
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367
U.S. 1 (1961).
140
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involve serious first amendment problems is attested to by United States
v. Harriss146 and Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Board.14 7 However, in these situations the governmental interest is far more sharply defined than is true when disclosure
is demanded by a subcommittee of a committee of a single house of
Congress operating under a broad charter 4 " or by an attorney general
invoking judicial aid in carrying out general provisions of law relating
149
to corporations.
There is great variation in the character of the specific questions
which witnesses have refused to answer, thereby subjecting themselves to contempt proceedings. Given the result in Dennis, the legislative interest in information regarding present Communist Party membership and activities must rate as substantial, and indeed this query
alone may be said to involve a minimum interference with first amendment interests, provided an adequate foundation is shown for interrogating the particular witness.1 5 0 Information regarding Communist
Party activities in the recent past likewise appears significant in relation to potential legislation regarding national security, but the more
remote in point of time, the more tenuous the connection with legislative
needs and the greater the adverse effect upon first amendment interests. Greater importance then attaches to the foundation for the particular question. 151 As the interrogation moves from Communist Party
membership into particular personal associations and utterances of the
individual the governmental stake in disclosure requires greater evidence of justification, not only to indicate the government's interest
which on the face of the query is less apparent, but also to counter the
added extent to which compulsory disclosure impairs associational
freedom. For Justices Harlan and Frankfurter this was the crux of
Sweezy. The Attorney General of New Hampshire had allegedly
146 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
The disclosure provisions of the Federal Lobbying
Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261 et seg. were held valid in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren.
Justices Douglas, Black and Jackson dissented. Justice Clark did not participate.
147 367 U.S. 1 (1961). It is noteworthy that only Justice Black would have
held the registration provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 50 U.S.C.
§ 786, violative of the first amendment. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas
and Brennan dissented on other grounds.
1481 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
In both Wilkinson and Braden, identification of the individual by another
witness was held sufficient. It is now held that no such foundation is needed to
149
150

justify questioning as to Communist Party membership addressed to an applicant

for admission to the bar. An examination into the applicant's character being

wholly permissible, refusal to answer questions reasonably related to prohibited

advocacy may be treated as an obstruction of the inquiry into character and fitness.
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).

In a companion case, Konigsberg v. State

Bar of California,' 366 U.S. 36 (1961), the Court described as "minimal" the effect
upon free association of such questioning in connection with a determination of
fitness to practice law.
151 But see note 150 supra.
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received considerable sworn testimony that the Progressive Party of
New Hampshire had been infiltrated heavily by members of the Communist Party and that its policy had been influenced by those members, that Sweezy was associated with organizations listed by the House
Un-American Activities Committee, and that he had co-authored an
article asserting that violence was less to be deplored when used by
the Soviet Union than by capitalist countries. 152 Such a foundation
these judges found inadequate to support interrogation of Sweezy as
to the contents of a lecture he had delivered at the University of New
Hampshire and as to his Progressive Party activities. Two years later
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan joined Mr. Justice Clark's opinion for
the Court affirming the conviction of Willard Uphaus for refusing to
produce the guest list of World Fellowship, Inc., though the subpoena
duces tecum was justified on virtually the same basis as asserted in
153
support of Sweezy's interrogation concerning the Progressive Party.
As noted earlier, the cases are distinguished on the basis that "the academic and political freedoms discussed in Sweezy v. New Hampshire
are not present here in the same degree since World Fellowship is
neither a university nor a political party."'154 As to why this difference
is of constitutional significance, the opinion does not opine. In many
ways the Uphaus record discloses a more drastic impact upon freedom
of association than had been shown in Sweezy, 155 and the governmental
justification is essentially the same as that described by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy as:
so meagre a countervailing interest of the State as may be argumentatively found in the remote, shadowy threat to the security of
New Hampshire allegedly presented in the origins and contributing elements of the Progressive Party and in petitioner's relations
to these."' 156
...

In Uphaus the governmental showing is deemed a sufficient nexus to
the very self preservation of the State itself.
2. Necessity and the Reasonably Available Alternative
In determining whether a particular measure falls within an enumerated power of Congress, the Supreme Court has from. an early time
354 U.S. 234, 261 (1957) (concurring opinion).
See p. 25, supra.
360 U.S. 72, 77 (1959).
155 When Uphaus was ordered to produce World Fellowship's guest list the
first report of the Attorney General had been published. See Subversive Activities
in New Hampshire, Report of the Attorney General to the New Hampshire General
Court (1955). The use made therein of the list of speakers furnished by Uphaus
(id. at 135-161) is detailed in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 91-92 (1959), and is discussed in the text below.
156 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (concurring opinion).
152
153
154
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regarded the necessity for the act as a matter for Congress, provided
only that it be adapted to an enumerated power. 5 7 Similarly state
legislation challenged on grounds of denial of substantive due process
has need only for reasonableness; the degree of necessity is not for the
Court. 158 However, when governmental action is alleged to violate
particular constitutional prohibitions, the process of accommodation of
competing interests has involved judicial consideration of necessity for
the particular measure. The question has frequently been put in terms
of the availability of an alternative to serve the governmental purpose
at less expense to the competing interests. The negative implications
of the commerce clause were invoked in Dean Milk Company v. City
of Madison'59 to invalidate a Madison, Wisconsin, ordinance requiring
all milk sold in the city to be pasteurized within five miles thereof.
Holding that the effect of the ordinance was to exclude wholesome
milk produced and pasteurized in Illinois, the Court faced the issue
"whether the discrimination inherent in the Madison ordinance can
be justified in view of the character of the local interests and the available methods of protecting them."' 60 When the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Clark, found "that reasonable and adequate alternatives
are available,"' 1 it proceeded to adjudge the ordinance unconstitutional as imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce.
In Schneider v. State' 62 the ordinances involved prohibited the unlicensed distribution of handbills on the public streets. The measures
were defended as designed to prevent littering, but the Court found
"obvious methods of preventing littering"'1 more compatible with
freedom of expression.
This element has been considered recently in compulsory disclosure
cases. Arkansas' claim to disclosure by teachers of all organizations
to which they belong or contribute was justified by the state in the interest of evaluation of its teachers. But for the Supreme Court majority "the statute's comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the
State's legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers.,,lO

The Los Angeles ordinance forbidding distribution of all anonymous
handbills was held invalid as not limited to the prevention of fraud,
65
false advertising and libel.'
157 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).

158 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).

159 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
160 Id. at 354.
161 Ibid.
162 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
163 Id. at 162.
164 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960).
165

Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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The factor of necessity has not been fully discussed in those cases
dealing with legislative investigations into "subversive" activities. The
informing of Congress for the purpose of legislation could arguably be
achieved at a lower price to associational privacy than that exacted
through the procedures of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities.' 6" The strong suggestion in Watkins that the resolution
establishing the Committee on Un-American Activities suffered from
overbroadness was not pressed by the Court when the issue was faced
in Barenblatt. That the authority to compel disclosure in an area of
such sensitivity to freedom of expression be not broader than necessary
for the achievement of justifiable ends is a requirement befitting the
role of the Court. 16 7 The difficulty with such an approach may be
traced in part to the uncertain status of exposure as an aspect of the
legislative process.
3. Exposure
Unwelcome exposure of beliefs and associations is an attribute of
compulsory disclosure impinging upon interests protected by the first
amendment. Indeed Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Shelton v. Tucker
contains the observation that "unwarranted publicizing" of the associational disclosures required of Arkansas teachers would present a very
different case from that actually before the Court.16 8 In his opinion for
the Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar of Californial6 " he discounts the
effect on first amendment interests of questioning an applicant for
admission to the bar concerning Communist Party membership because
the proceedings were held in private. However, exposure in the context
of the legislative investigation is a matter apart and at least in some
circumstances has affirmative claims of its own. There is danger in the
simplicity of the Watkins dictum, "We have no doubt that there is
no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure." Indeed the
statement is immediately qualified: "The public is, of course, entitled
to be informed concerning the workings of its government.' 170 A line
has been drawn between the informing function of the legislative committee in connection with governmental operations and the exposure
of the private activities of individuals. 171 However, even in the latter
area the publicity aspect of legislative inquiry has been defended as itself
106 See the discussion by Mr. Justice Frnkfdurter of the rules of procedure of
the Civil Rights Commission in Hanah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 486 (1960)
(concurring opinion), notably in regard to abstaining from public exposure (id. at
492).
167 See Kalven, Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn and The Barenblatt Opinion, 27
U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 327-28 (1960).
168 364 U.S. 479, 499 (1961)
(dissenting opinion).
169 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
170 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
171 See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
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a vital part of the process.' 7 2 To declare that legislative interrogation
is unlawful if conducted for no ostensible purpose save exposure of the
conduct of private citizens is to contribute little to solution of real
problems. The potential of legislative power is so broad that almost
any inquiry a congressional committee might conduct can be rationally
connected to some legislative purpose through careful drafting of the
authorizing resolution. 173 This accomplished, exposure can at the very
least be defended as an inevitable by-product of the inquiry; beyond
that the publicity attendant upon investigation creates public awareness
and opinion which in turn affects the process of enactment.
That exposure may be denominated a two-edged sword does not
mean that the relative sharpness of those edges is a constant. To the
extent that inquiry pertains to matters close to the political and intellectual autonomy of the individual, exposure lays a heavy hand on first
amendment interests, and the competing needs of the government for
information, and for exposure, become vital factors for a court. The
argument that the public need be informed of the necessity for legislation suffers when the legislation in question concerns areas in which
statutes are subject to specific constitutional prohibitions. It revives
considerably when the asserted governmental interest also relates to the
security of the government itself. At this point there is need for emphasis on the distinction between exposure in the form of publication by
a committee and the use of compulsory process to exact the exposure
from the unwilling witness. The traditional doctrine of legislative immunity accords great latitude to the legislative committee in publicizing its findings, its opinions, and the factual bases for them. 174 What is
in issue is not the power to expose but rather the power to compel witnesses either to participate in exposing their associations and those of
others or suffer consequences in the form of contempt proceedings or
other adverse governmental action.
75
Exposure was a predominant element in Uphaus v. Wyman.1 It
176
formed the basis of Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent.
At the time Uphaus refused to obey the Superior Court order to produce the guest
list of World Fellowship he had already furnished the investigating
committee with a list of speakers and had seen that list published in
the initial committee report to the legislature. 17 7 Twenty-one speakers
172 "A representative democracy relies upon the creation of a favorable public
opinion for the acceptance and thus the enforcement of new legislation." Brief for
the United States in Watkins v. United States, p. 55, n.29. Compare statement of
government counsel on oral argument, 354 U.S. 178, 187, n.8 (1957).
173 See Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, in Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S.
399, 417 (1961).
174 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
175 360 U.S. 72 (1959).

176

Id. at 82.

177 Subversive Activities in New Hampshire, supra note 145.
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were discussed in some detail as having "records of affiliation with the
Communist Party, Communist-infiltrated groups, or Communist-supported causes.' 7 8 Thirty-six others were listed by names, the report
stating that "the following individuals would appear at this time to be
the usual contingent of 'dupes' and unsuspecting persons that surround
almost every venture that is instigated or propelled by the 'perennials'
and articulate apologists for Communists and Soviet chicanery, but of
this fact we are not certain.' 79 In this setting Uphaus persisted in his
refusal to furnish the committee with the list of guests. The policy of
the committee with respect to publication of names was clear. One need
not agree with Justice Brennan's use of this material to show a purpose
to expose for exposure's sake to conclude that the effect of such exposure upon associational interests protected by the fourteenth amendment far outweighs the state interest in such a sweeping disclosure.
Though the decision in Pennsylvania v. Nelson"' was here held not
to preclude state investigation into the need for legislation to protect
the state, the scope of that legislative interest should be discounted
by the Smith Act,' 8' as construed in the Nelson case. Again it may be
observed that while the publication itself appears immune to judicial
control, the inevitable involvement of the judicial process when compulsory disclosure is resorted to requires careful assessment of these
competing interests. The concern of the Court with unwarranted publication in Shelton v. Tucker'8 2 seems equally appropriate to Uphaus v.
l83
Wyman.
The factor of necessity is closely related. Does the legislative interest
of New Hampshire fairly necessitate the kind of publication described
above, or can the state's interest, including its interest in an informed
public, be served by means less oppressive to rights of associational
privacy? Close attention to circumstances such as these is essential if
the Court is truly "to balance the competing interests." The status of
exposure as a legislative function is a significant factor and to this
point has been sadly neglected. Judicial recognition of such an interest
may be fraught with serious implications for first amendment freedoms, but the legislative interest to be accommodated can be confined
to that which the legislature is willing to articulate. 8 4 Thus while
178

17

Id. at 136.

Id. at 154.

180

350 U.S. 497 (1956).

182

364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960).

181

18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1956).

183 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
184 This is particularly true in regard to criminal prosecutions under 2 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1958) where the standard of pertinency is an element of the statutory
offense. Confinement of the scope of inquiry where the House of Congress employs
its inherent contempt power is more difficult. See generally, Morgan, Congressional
Investigations and Judicial Review: Kilbourn v. Thompson Revisited, 37 Calif. L.
Rev. 556 (1949).
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much exposure of private expression could arguably be justified to
inform the public of the possible need for a constitutional amendment
altering the first amendment, such a forthright congressional declaration is not politically foreseeable. In its absence the Court retains,
insofar as compulsory disclosure is concerned, the power to judge
between the governmental interest in publicity in particular circumstances and the competing demands of the first amendment. To render
such a judgment on the side of the interests of free expression, as
might well have been the result in Uphaus, does not require a sweeping condemnation of any legislative function of informing the public
outside the realm of government operation. There is gross oversimplification in the phrase "exposure for exposure's sake."
4. Motive and the First Amendment
In the section of this paper which dealt with determining the validity
of the legislative purpose of an inquiry, it was asserted that courts ought
not to probe behind the articulated purpose of the legislature for the
reasons motivating a particular enactment. By the same token, motives
or ulterior purposes of a legislative committee in demanding certain
information were considered irrelevant to the question whether the
demand reasonably related to the avowed legislative purpose. However, that discussion did not pertain to the solution of first amendment
problems but rather to the preliminary issue of basic governmental
authority. Once this issue is disposed of favorably to the asserted
power, the judicial inquiry shifts to the complexities of free expression.
In determining the effect of compulsory disclosure on first amendment
interests, the motive of the delegate exercising power and conceivably
of the legislature itself may have a relevance not present in regard to
the previous question.18 5 Reduced to its simplest terms the point is
this: If an actor's conduct by its nature tends to produce a certain
effect, the likelihood of that effect increases if it is the intent of the
actor to produce it.186 Translated into the present context, if the use
of process to compel disclosure before a legislative committee in a
given situation both serves a legislative purpose and adversely affects
185 "The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth

Amendment,

because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite
than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the
due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its
standard." Mr. Justice Jackson in Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
639 (1943).
186 See Holmes, The Common Law 68-69 (1887). For an interesting discussion
of intent in relation to a determination of the probability of an apprehended evil
flowing from legislatively prohibited speech, see Richardson, Freedom of Expression

and The Function of Courts, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 13-15 (1951). He concludes,
"Intent, or its absence, should thus be relevant only in so far as it supplies evidence
of the probable effect, or lack of it, of utterances otherwise colorless or ambiguous."
Id. at 15.
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first amendment interests, evidence that the committee's aim relates
primarily to the latter is material to the Court's assessment of that
deterrent effect and thus to judicial accommodation of the competing
interests. This position receives some support from the Barenblatt
opinion. Though the Court disclaims interest in the motives of committee members, the following excerpts indicate a concern:
Nor can it fairly be concluded that this investigation was directed at controlling what is being taught at our universities rather
than at overthrow. The statement of the Subcommittee Chairman
at the opening of the investigation discloses no such intention,
and so far as this record reveals nothing thereafter transpired
which would justify our holding that the thrust of the investigation later changed. The record discloses considerable testimony
concerning the foreign domination and revolutionary purposes
and efforts of the Communist Party. That there was also testimony on the abstract philosophical level does not detract from the
dominant theme of this investigation-Communist infiltration
furthering1 the alleged ultimate purpose of overthrow. (Emphasis
added.) 1
And again,
Having scrutinized this record we cannot say that the unanimous
panel of the Court of Appeals which first considered this case was
wrong in concluding that "the primary purposes of the18 8 inquiry
were in aid of legislative processes." (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion in Uphaus contains no such language.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, states:

Mr.

We have a detailed inquiry into an assemblage the general contours of which were already known on the one hand, and on the
other the remote and speculative possibility of some sort of legislation-albeit legislation in a field where there are serious constitutional limitations. We have this in the context of an inquiry which
was in practice being conducted in its overwhelming thrust as a
vehicle of exposure, and where the practice had been followed of
publishing names on the basis of a "not proven" verdict. (Emphasis
added.) 18 9

Justice Brennan's painstaking treatment of the record virtually precluded an assessment such as Justice Harlan's for the Court in Barenblatt.
This concern with motive and purpose in relation to effect is not
novel; it has support in prior decisions of the Court. The commerce
clause of the Constitution has long been construed as limiting but not
187

360 U.S. 109, 131-32 (1959).

188

Id. at 133.

189 360 U.S. 72, 106-07 (1959)

(dissenting opinion).
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precluding state regulation of interstate commerce.190 The clause invalidates state laws which discriminate against interstate commerce' 9 '
or which produce an adverse effect thereon which outweighs the state
interest promoted. l9 2 The emphasis is rightly upon the effect of the
challenged measure, but the Court has recognized the intimate relationship between the effect of a statute and the underlying reasons for
its enactment. 193
Application of a statute valid upon its face may be challenged under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by virtue of
alleged discrimination in its administration. In such cases the Court has
avowed the materiality of the purpose of the administrator. Snowden
v. Hughes'94 involved an action for damages under the Civil Rights
Act against state election officials who allegedly discriminated against
the plaintiff in failing to include his name on a ballot in violation of
state law. Although defendant's failure to certify the plaintiff as a
successful candidate in a primary was characterized as "malicious"
and "wilful," the complaint was held insufficient to set out a denial of
equal protection. Mr. Justice Stone wrote:
The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute
fair upon its face, resulting in its unequal application to those
who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the
face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person,
(citation omitted) or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence
showing a discriminatory design to favor one individual or class
over another not to be inferred from the action itself, Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-4.195
Denial of equal protection to a Negro defendant through the exclusion of Negroes from a jury requires more than the absence of Negroes
from the particular panel; deliberate exclusion is necessary. 196 This is
normally shown by evidence of the customary absence of Negroes from
juries in the locality, thus giving rise to the inference of a systematic
97
practice.1
10o Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299
(1851).
'9' Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
192 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
193 Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1945) ; Hood & Sons, Inc., v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
See Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 533, 550
(1951).
'94 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
195 Id. at 8.
'19 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323 (1879); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S.
316, 320-21 (1906) ; Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278-82 (1909) ; Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945).
'97 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 379, (1881); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
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Discrimination is likewise at the heart of the recent case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot' 98 in which the Court upheld under the fifteenth
amendment the sufficiency of a complaint alleging discriminatory deprivation of the right to vote. The challenge was to an Alabama statute
redefining the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, so as to produce an
irregular twenty-eight sided figure, leaving outside the city limits all
but four or five of its Negro voters without removal of a single white
resident. Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court:
While in form this is merely an act redefining metes and bounds,
if the allegations are established, the inescapable human effect of
this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens,
and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting
rights. 9
To the state's claim of unfettered power in drawing municipal boundaries the Court responded:
When a state exercises power wholly within the domain of state
interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right. This principle
has had many applications. It has long been recognized in cases
which have prohibited a state from exploiting a power acknowledged to be absolute in an isolated context to justify the imposition
of an "unconstitutional condition." What the Court has said in
those cases is equally applicable here, viz., that 'Acts generally
lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end, (citation omitted) and a constitutional power cannot be
used by way of condition
to attain an unconstitutional result.'
200
(Emphasis added.)
The concern with the purpose of exercising an admitted power is
clear, but the parallel to the first amendment and compulsory disclosure must not be overdrawn. The Court notes that against the
claim of discrimination the state advances no specific municipal concern which is served by the statute in question. But the Court does
not suggest that any semblance of an interest would suffice. It is not
the assertion here that the establishment of a purposeful policy of
exposure would per se invalidate a governmental demand for information. It is believed that such a showing should be considered as evidencing a strong likelihood that exposure will result, thus necessitating
consideration of exposure's legitimate contribution to the governmental
587, 589 (1935) ; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 357 (1939) ; Hill v. Texas,
316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1947);
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958); cf. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282, 290 (1950).
198 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
'99 Id. at 347.
20o Ibid.
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interest and the extent to which it impairs associational rights protected by the Constitution.
The close relationship between effect and motive in a first amend20 1
ment setting is found in Grosjean v. American Press Company.
A Louisiana statute imposed a license tax of two per cent of gross receipts upon all newspapers with circulation in excess of twenty thousand copies per week. Publishers of the thirteen newspapers affected
sought an injunction against enforcement of the tax upon the ground,
inter alia, that the act violated the first amendment prohibition against
abridgement of freedom of the press made applicable to the states by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In affirming a
decree enjoining enforcement, the Supreme Court unanimously held
the statute unconstitutional as an abridgement of the freedom of the
press in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court relied almost entirely upon the historical use of such
taxes to curtail the press and the English struggle against these exactions. This the Court found to be the background of the first amendment provision relating to the press. Of the particular tax the opinion
by Mr. Justice Sutherland contains the following:
It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present
setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the
guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which
the
°2
public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties
The Court was silent as to details of the "present setting," but the
record was not. The complaint contained allegations that the measure
was intended as reprisal or punishment by the dominant political faction of the state directed at a hostile press. These allegations were supported by affidavits which apparently were persuasive to the Court.2 03
Specific reference to them would have given express recognition to the
relevance of motive or ulterior purpose, for on its face the measure
disclosed a revenue producing function. Despite failure to elaborate
on the situation, the quotation makes clear the Court's awareness of the
particular use to which the tax was being put.
Consideration of motive in connection with compulsory disclosure
should be sharply limited. Such a showing does not render for an
invalid purpose interrogation which reasonably relates to a valid governmental objective. But even the latter interrogation is subject to
first amendment prohibitions, and in connection therewith effect on
freedom of expression is of paramount concern. Accommodation is par201 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
202 Id. at 250.

203 See Transcript of Record in the Supreme Court of the United States,
pp. 41-48. Grosjean v. American Press Co., note 201 supra.
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ticularly difficult here because the Court is at best dealing with probable
effects rather than actual effects of enacted legislation particularly applied. This in considerable part explains the Court's reluctance to downgrade the legislative interest in information sought where relevance to
possible legislation is shown. Yet this very latitude subjects other constitutional interests to great pressure. The relation of desired objective
to probable result is such as to render useful consideration of what
effect a committee desires to produce. A committee which enunciates
exposure as one of its policies will in all likelihood do more exposing
than one whose practices indicate concern for the protection of associational privacy. 24 The attention of the Court thus may be drawn to a
determination of the scope and effect of exposure; it may conclude in
a given case that the exposure is justified by the governmental interest
involved. This is far different from a refusal to consider the expressed
policy of the committee on the ground that motive is irrelevant. It
is one thing for a court to refuse to invalidate a statute on its face
because of the possibility that it may be administered in a fashion
detrimental to freedom of expression. It is quite another for a court
to refuse consideration to a demonstrated intent so to administer on
the part of the governmental agency.
These factors were present in Wilkinson v. United States20 5 and
Braden v. United States.20 6 Petitioners' contentions that their interrogations were prompted by the committee's desire to censure criticism
of itself were treated in relation to the existence of a valid legislative
purpose rather than in connection with the first amendment, but their
disposition is meaningful to the present discussion. Wilkinson was
subpoenaed to appear before the subcommittee after he arrived in
Atlanta to oppose publicly the holding of the hearings in question.
Braden had likewise opposed the Committee in the South, and one
of the subcommittee's announced purposes was investigation of Communism in that sector of the country. Wilkinson and Braden had
each been once identified as a Communist Party member. The Court
rightly pointed out that a witness cannot obtain immunity to process
simply by criticizing the committee. But let us assume that the
petitioners could show a general and deliberate committee practice of
summoning as witnesses critics of the committee whom anybody had
once accused of Communist Party involvement. The deterrent effect on
204 See Random Selection of Statements by the House Un-American Activities
Committee on Exposure and Punishment of Subversives, Appendix to Opinion of
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 163
(1959). See also Gellhorn, Report on a Report of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1193 (1947).
205 365 U.S. 399 (1961).

206 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
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public expression of criticism of the committee seems obvious; careless accusations of Communism are all too frequent. Add to this the
Court's quotation in Barenblatt that "the remedy for abuse of legislative
power lies in the people upon whom, after all, under our institutions,
reliance must be placed for the correction ... 207 and the picture takes
on the shape of a vicious circle. To be sure, the circumstances of the
interrogation of Wilkinson and Braden do not establish conclusively
such a committee purpose, but the Court should not close its eyes to
evidence of such purpose which others can and will see, for the deterrent effect on the expression of those others can rob the process of the
corrective mechanism upon which the Court itself has relied. This for
me is the real weakness of the uncritical citation of Barenblatt as dispositive of the grave first amendment issues posed by Wilkinson and
Braden.
CONCLUSION

"Perhaps the most delicate and shifting of all balances which the
Court is expected to maintain is that between liberty and authority."
These were the words of Mr. Justice Jackson after a thirteen-year
career on the Supreme Court. 20 8 The Court does well to pause when
its deliberations touch the inner workings of a coordinate branch of
government. On the other hand, the case for judicial enforcement of
a Bill of Rights is at its strongest when free speech is involved. That
wise counselor of judicial self-restraint, Judge Learned Hand, has
stated itthus:
The most important issues here arise when a majority of the
voters are hostile, often bitterly hostile, to the dissidents against
whom the statute is directed; and legislatures are more likely than
courts to repress what ought to be free. It is true that the periods
of passion or panic are ordinarily not very long and that they
are usually succeeded by a serener and more tolerant temper;
but, as I have just said, serious damage may have been done that
cannot be undone, and no restitution is ordinarily possible for the
individuals who have suffered. This
is a substantial and important
20 9
advantage of wide judicial review.
To the harm to the individual must be added the harm to the functioning of the very system on which respect for the legislative process
depends, the system of free exchange of ideas. Although Judge Hand
spoke of statutes, not of summonses, of legislation rather than investigation, these words have meaning for a society in which the legislative
inquiry has become an established tool of government.
207
208

360 U.S. 109, 133 (1959).
Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government 75

(1955).
209

Hand, The Bill of Rights 69 (1958).
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With characteristic forthrightness Justice Jackson took his stand:
I should not want to be understood as approving the use that
the Committee on Un-American Activities has frequently made
of its power. But I think it would be an unwarranted act of judicial
usurpation to strip Congress of its investigatory power, or to
assume for the courts the function of supervising congressional
committees. I should affirm the judgment below and leave the
responsibility for the behavior of its committees squarely on the
210
shoulders of Congress.

The reply has been authored by Zechariah Chafee, Jr.:
Free speech gets little attention and the dangers are everything.
The legislative judgment is not reached "after due deliberation."
So the indispensable balancing will have to be done by the courts
or not at all. If judges cannot or will not review suppressions, then
legislators and officials are left free to penalize speech and thoughts
211
as much as they may desire, and they desire a great deal.
This paper represents an attempt to focus upon the narrow point
at which the traditional function of the judiciary touches the legislative
power to investigate. With most aspects of a legislative inquiry the
Court has no concern. The doctrine of legislative immunity preserves
a barrier against judicial interference with the processes of law making.
It is only when the legislature enlists the aid of the judicial process to
enforce the cooperation of the individual or itself directly coerces the
individual in a manner entitling him to invoke the time honored jurisdiction of courts that the Supreme Court may have occasion to inquire into the validity of the legislative practice itself. This point is of
course reached when government demands he disclose information and
seeks his punishment upon refusal.
The factors set forth above as appropriate to the process of decision
do not appear clearly and singly in actual litigation. They vary in importance with the circumstances of cases and with the attitudes of
judges; and these variations may well be controlling in determination
of outcome. The enunciation of competing general principles in this
area is relatively easy, but their accommodation in context is not accomplished by a declaration of result accompanied by the simple announcement that the Court has balanced the competing interests. In
the words of Herbert Wechsler, "The virtue or demerit of a judgment turns, therefore, entirely on the reasons that support it and their
adequacy to maintain any choice of values it decrees, or, it is vital that
we add, to maintain the rejection of a claim that any given choice
should be decreed.

'212

Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 196 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty 85 (1956).
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 19-20 (1959).
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